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JAMES ROBERT WITT et a1., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. 
RAYMOND LESTEH JACKSON, Defendant and Re-
spondent; CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Intervener and 
Appellant. 
[1] Trial-Instructions--Requests-Necessity.-It was incumbent 
on plaintiffs who requested the instruction of which they COIll-
plain to offer any desired modification. 
[2] Automobiles-Instl"Uctions-Violation of Regulations-Justift-
cation.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by two 
policemen when their patrol ear was struck from the rear by 
defendant's automobile while th~y were engaged in stopping 
another automobile for investigation, where there was nothing 
in the record to suggest a justification or excuse for plaintiff 
driver's violation of either Veh. Code, § 544, subd. (c) (now 
§ 22109), requiring an appropriate signal before stopping or 
suddenly decreasing speed, or § 526, subd. (a) (now § 21658), 
relatulg to drh'ing in laned roadways, except that he was a 
Jaw enforcem<'nt officer investigating a driver Sluspected of 
intoxication, whether this circumstance justified violating 
statutory standards of conduct was presented to the jury in an 
instruction on Yeh. Code, § 454 (now §§ 21055, 21056), grant-
ing exemptions to authorized emergency vehicles under certain 
eonditions. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Autolllobiles, §§ ISS, 413; Am.Jur., Automo-
biles and Highway Traffi!', § 213 et St'q. 
McK. Dig. References: (1) Trial, § 136; [2, 3) Autolllobile~, 
§ 319; [4] Aut()llIobiJt!~. ~ 3~;): [.1, 6] Alltolllllhile", § 110; [7) Neg-
ligence, § 247; [8) Alltolllobile~, § 30601; [9, 10] Evidence, § 165; 
[11) Evidence, § 326.5; [12. 13] Automobiles, § 350-1; [14] Appeal 
and Error, § 1095; (15) Contribution, § 8; [16-18] Workmen'os 
Compensation, § 36.5. 
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[8] Id.-Instructions-Violation of Regulations.-In an action for 
personal injuries sustained by two policemen when their patrol 
car was strucl( from the rear hy defcnd:lllt's automobile while 
they were engaged in storrill'~ :lllotlH'r automobile for in-
vestigation, it was proper to give an instruction on Veh. Code, 
§ 526 (now § 21658), rel:.iting to driving in lanC'd roadways, 
where there wos conflicting testimony os to whether plaintiff 
driver changed lanes, defendant having testified that plnintiff 
did so when the cars were only about 100 feet or six car lengths 
apart, whereas plaintiff testified thot he first saw defendant's 
headlights in his rcar-yiew mirror about three or four seconds 
before the impact, since the jury could infer that plaintiff had 
changed lane:; and moved into the path of defendant's car 
without determining w11ether he could do so with safety. 
[4] Id.-Instructions-Signals.-In an action for personal injUl'ies 
sustained by two policemen when their patrol car was struck 
from the rear by defendant's automobile while they were en-
gaged in stopping another automobile for investigation, there 
was substantial evidence to justify an instruction on Veh. 
Code, § 544 (now § 22109), requiring an appropriate signal 
before a sudden decrease in speed, where plaintiff driver testi-
fied that after he had drawn alongside the other automobile 
he "started to decelerate so that I could pull behind the car 
that we were pulling over," the driver of the other car testified 
that after he saw the flash of plaintiff rider's flashlight he 
drove off the ronuway and stoppcd, and defendnnt testified 
that after the police car moved into his lane its brake lights 
went on, that when lll~ was approxillllltely 50 to 75 feet behind 
it its red roof lights went on, and thllt he then IIttempted to 
stop. It was for the jury to determine in the light of this 
evidence whether the brake lights and roof lights constituted 
an "approprillte sign Ill" within the meaning of the code section. 
[5a t 5b] Id.-Emergency Vchicles-"Due Regard" Clause.-In lin 
aetion for personal injuries sustaincd by two policemen when 
their patrol cal' was struck frolll the re011' by uefendnnt's auto-
mobile while they were ellgoged in stoppill~! another automobile 
for investigation, wherein the court instructcd the jury thllt 
the police car WIlS an llutho1'izC'd eJllCJ'geney y('hide, the ques-
tion whether plnintiff driver showed "due regard for the safety 
of all persons using the highway," as required by Veh. Code, 
§ 454 (now §§ 21055, 21056), was properly submitted to th" 
jury in view of conflicting evidence as to whether he turned 
on the red roof lights ~()on enough to warn defendllnt to stop 
his vehicle or yipld the right of WilY. 
[6] Id.-Emergency Vehicles-"Due Regard" Clause.-The "due 
regard" c:ause of Veh. Code, § 454 (now §§ 21055, 21056) re- i 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d., Automobiles, §§ 132, 157, 192. 
) 
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quires the operator of an emergency vchicle to give a suitable 
warning to afford other users of public highways an oppor-
tunity to yicld the right of way. He does not meet this require-
ment if he does not give the required warning until a co1lision 
is inevitable. 
[7] Negligence-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-An in-
struction in an lIutomobile collision case that plaintiffs had 
the burden of proving that defendant's negligence was "the" 
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries (instead of "a" proxi-
mate cause) was not prejudicial, in the light of an instruction 
that the acts or omissions of two or more persons may concur 
in causing an injury and that each such act or omission is 
regarded liS It proximate cause. 
[8] Automobiles - Instructions - Disposition of Requests.-In n 
rear-end collision ease involving a police car engaged in stop-
ping a third car for investigation, it was not error to refuse 
to instruct that when a person's employment requires him to 
take risks that a reasonahly prudent person could avoid the 
necessities of such a situation lessen the amount of calltioll 
required of him by law in the exercise of ordinary care, 
where there was no evidence that the taking of such risks 
was requircd, and the court gave other pertinent instructions 
such as that negligence is relative and not ahsolute. 
[9] Evidence-Admissibility of Whole Where Part Is Proved.-
The rule that where part of a conversation has been shown in 
testimony the remainder may be brought out by the opposing 
party (Code Civ. Proc., § 1854) is necessarily subject to the 
qualification that the court may exclude tho~e portions of the 
conversation not relevant to the items introduced. 
[10] Id.-Admissibility of Whole Where Part Is Proved.-In an 
action for personal injurics sustained by two policelllen when 
their patrol car was struck from the rear by defendant's auto-
mobile while they were engaged in stopping another automobile 
for investigation, the admission of that portion of a statement 
by plaintiff driver to an investigating officer that he did not 
turn on the roof lights until after he had driven the police 
car alongside the other llutomolJile did not require admission 
of the remainder of the stntement that plaintiff driver then 
looked in his renr view mirror and saw II vehicle coming 
toward him at approximately 65 miles per hour, since the 
excluded part did not tend to explain the inconsistencies be-
tween the part that was admitted and plaintiff's testimony, 
and although the excluded part might indirectly suggest thllt 
defendant may have had enough time to avoid the accident 
after the roof lights were turned on, the eXlict time sequence 
[9] See Cal.Jul'.2d, Evidcllce, ~ 129; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 275. 
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of events in the fcw IIWllleut::; l'rl'I·('olill~ till' Iwcidcnt WIIS Ih,! 
subject of abundnnt testimony. 
[11) Id. - Documentary Evidence - Hospital Records. - The trilll 
court in an autolllobile collision cnse did not cOllllllit prejudidal 
enol' in ruling that defendunt'l< hO~l'ital record could lIut he 
ll(lmitted in evideilce unles!:' the part of the record thnt Tt'-
fel'red to his eondition as "HED 2-plu;;" "\'I'IIS d('lete,L With-
out nn ncc(llllpall~'ing explanation, thi!' cryptie, ll'ehmeal ref-
erence could !'crvc only to ('oufu;:c and lIIislead the jury, 
[12] Automobiles-Instructions-Contribut.ory Negligence-Riders. 
-In an action for p('rt:;onlll injurie~ sustlliued b~' two police-
men whcn their patrol cllr was strucl, from the real' by de-
fendant's automobile while thcy were cngllgcd in stopping an-
other automobile for illvN;tigntiou, plaiutiff rider (other thau 
the driver) correctly eOlltended that he W:lS prejudiced becllllse 
thc instructions relating to contributory negligence were sub-
mitted to the jury without an expl:llllltion that the issue of 
eontributory negligence did not have any bearing on his cause 
of IIction, wherc defl'ndant (lid not plead such plnintilf's con-
tributory negligcnce and concede<1 tha t imputed neglig'enl:t' 
was not in issue, and there was no evidence that such plaintifi 
was contributively negligent, 
[18] Id. - Instructions - Contributory Negligence-Passengers.---
When a passenger and driver bring an action against a third 
party, it is prejudicial error to give an instruction on the 
passenger's contributory negligence if that defense is not sup-
ported by substantial evidence and if there is sub"t:mtial evi-
dence that the drivel' and defendant were ne('di;,;ent. 
[14] Appeal-Invited Error-Instructions.-In an action for per-
sonal injuries sustained by twu polil:emen when their patrol 
car was struck frolll the renr by defendant's nutolllobile while 
they were engnged ill stopping another autolllobile for iuy('!'-
tigation, plaintifft:;' }'equest fOl' instl'ul'tiollS that "the instru('-
tions given you npply to each plaintiff unless otherwise stated," 
and that if the .iury !<hould find that a plninWr is entitled to 
recover it must asse!'!; the damage of ellch separately /lIld 
return a verdict in n sepal'llte amount for elll'h, did not invite 
the erroneous instructioll reque,;tecl by defendant. submitting 
the issue of plaintiil' l'id('l"S (as distinguished from ]llaintitr 
driver's) contributory lH'l!'ligl'lH'e to th(' jury. 
[15] Contribution-Joint Tortfeasors.-Since enactment of Code 
Civ, Proc., §§ 875-880 in 1957 abrogntt'cl the rule of lloncon-
trihution among joint tortf'eal;on; thnt 11l'cviously existed, in 
the absence of the 'Worknll'n's COmp<'llRntion At't a ncgligent. 
third party would be allowed ('ontributioll a;r:1in!'<t a eonl'ur-
rently negligent employer if t,]1(' I'llnditiollS of th(' 1'011(' s('('tions 
were met. 
Dec. 1961] WITT v. JACKSON 
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[16] Workmen's Compensation-Actions Against Third Persons-
Right to Contribution or Rcimbursement.- A third party is 
entitled to have a judgment against him reduced by the amount 
of compensation paid to an injured employee if he can prove 
that the concnrrent negligence of the employer contributed 
to the injurips suffered by the employee. It is contrary to the 
policy of the law for the employer or his subrogee, the insur-
ance carrier, tn profit by the wrong- of the employer. 
[17] Id.-Actions Against Third Persons-Right to Oontribution 
or Reimbursement.-·Whether an aetion is brought by liD em-
ployer or an injured employee, a third party tortf"1I8or should 
be able to invoke the concurrent negligence of the employer 
to defeat itl" right to reimbursement, since in either event the 
action is brought for the benefit of the employer to the extent 
that compensation benefits have been paid the employee. 
rI8] Id.-Actions Against Third Persons-Right to Contribution 
or Reimbursement.-Whell a person is entitled to indemnity , 
against a negligent employer, the employer cannot recover 
reimbursement fol' compensatio\l payments made to an injured 
employee either by asserting a lien against a judgment re-
covered by the employee or by bringing an action directly 
against the third party. A negligent elilployer should be in 
no better position when the third party tortfeasor does not 
seek indemnity; to allow the employer reimbursement in 
either ease would allow him to profit hy 11is own wrong. Since, 
however, the injured employee may not be allowed double 
recovery, his damages must be reduced by the amount of work-
men's compensation he received. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William B. Neeley, Judge. Affirmed ill 
part and reversed in part. 
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a 
rear-end collision of automobiles. Judgment for defendant 
affirmed as to plaintiff driYer and intervener employer and 
reversed as to plaintiff rider. 
Murray Jackson for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Bourke Jones, Assistant 
City Attorney, Edwin F. Shinn and Sanford M. Gage, Deputy 
City Attorneys, jor Intervrner and Appellant. 
Spray, Gould & Bowers and Jean Wunderlieh for Drfp)Hl-
ant and Respondent. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-This action was brougbt by James Witt 
and Julius Grossman to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained when the automobile ill wllich they wcre riding was 
struck from the rear by one owned and operated hy defelldant 
Jackson. The City of Los Angeles, plaintiffs' employer and 
owner of the vehicle that was being driven by "'itt at the time 
of the accident, intervened to recover for the damag-e to its 
automobile and for workmen's compensation benefits and med-
ical expenses paid to plaintiffs. Judgment was entered on 
jury verdicts for defendant and against both plaintiffs and 
the city. Plaintiffs and intervener appeW. 
The accident occurred in a posted 45 mile per hour speed 
lOne on Sepulveda Boulevard in Los Angeles at approximately 
2 :30 a. m. on March 3, 1958. Sepulveda Boulevard is a straight 
north and south four-lanc highway with a double white line 
in the center. The impact occurred in the northbound lane 
adjacent to the double white line. Both plaintiffs were in 
uniform and were on duty as police officers. They were in a 
marked, black and white police ear with two red lights on 
the roof, which shone toward front and rear when turned 011. 
According to plaintiffs' version of the accident, they were 
traveling north on Sepulveda Boulevard in the Jane next to 
the double white line when the~" saw a 1957 Dodge traveling 
ahead of them at approximately 20 to 25 milE's per hour in th(' 
right lane for northbound traffic. Because it was moving so 
slowly when traffic conditions were light, plaintiffs suspected 
that the driver was under the influence of alcohol. ,Yitt pulled 
the police car alongside tIle Dodge, and in accordance with 
normal police procedures, Grossman flashed his flashlight at 
thc driver of the Dodge to attract his attention. As the Dodge 
was moving off the roadway and stopping, 'Witt slowed down 
to get behind it, looked in the rear-view mirror and observed 
headlights moving rapidly toward him, and heard brakes or 
tires screeching. Thc police car was struck from the rear by 
defendant's car. Witt testified on direct examination that he 
turned on the red roof lights" just prior" to pulling alongside 
the Dodge and estimated that the impact occurred 5 to 10 
seconds thereafter. He testified on cross-examination that he 
turned them on when he was approximately 50 feet bchind 
the Dodge. He had stated in a prior admission that hE' turned 
them on after he had pulled alongside the Dodge. 
Defe'ndant testified that he was a California highway patrol-
man, returning home from all eyening at his brot}H'r's home. 
Although he was in uniform, he was not on duty. lIe admitted 
Dec. 1961] Wrrr 1). JACKSON 
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drinking two glasses of beer at lunch during the preceding 
afternoon and about a quart of beer at his brother's home, 
which was located approximately 5 miles from the scene of 
the accident. .AB he was traveling north on Sepulveda Boule-
vard in the lane next to the double white line at approximately 
35 miles per hour, he first observed the taillights of what 
proved to be plaintiffs' car in the right haud lane. He ob-
served it change to the lane in which he was traveling when 
he was approximately 100 feet behind it. He applied his 
brakes as soon as the red roof lights of the police car went on. 
Re estimated that he was then 50 to 75 feet behind it. 
Plaintiffs challenge the instructions relating to the con-
tributory negligence of plaintiff Witt. In addition to giving 
the standard instruction on the subject of contributory negli-
gence, the trial eourt, at defcndant's request, instructed the 
jury in the language of Vehicle Code sections 544, subdivision 
(c) (now § 22109) and 526, subdivision (a) (now § 21658) . 
•• No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a 
vehicle on a highway without first giving an appropriate signal 
in the manner provided in this chapter. to the driver of any 
vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to 
give such signal." (§ 544, subd. (c).) .. A vehicle shall be 
driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and 
shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has 1irst 
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." 
(§ 526, subd. (a).) Immediately following the giving of these 
instructions, at plaintiffs' request the court instructed the 
jury that conduct in violation of a section of the Vehicle Code 
is negligence as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs object to the latter instruction because it was not 
qualified by a statement that a violation of a statutory standard 
creates only a presumption of negligence that may be rebutted 
by evidence of justific.ation or excuse. (See Alarid V. Vanier, 50 
Ca1.2d 617, 621 [327 P .2d 897].) [ 1] Plaintiffs, JlOwever, re-
quested the instruction of which they complain and it was 
incumbent upon them to offer any desired modification. 
(Ornales V. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474,479 [218 P.2d 531) ; Town-
sendv. Butterfield, 168 Cal. 564, 569 [143 P. 760).) [2] More-
over, there is nothing in the record to suggest a justification or 
excuse for Witt's violation of either Vehicle Code provision 
except that he was a law enforcement officer investigating a 
driver suspected of intoxication. Whether this circumstance 
justified violating statutory standards of conduct was pre-
sented to the jury in all instruction on Vehicle Code section 
) 
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454, which grants exemptions to authorized emergency vehicles 
under certain conditions. 
Plaintiffs contend that the court should not have given a 
general instruction on contributory negligence or the instruc-
tions on Vehicle Code sections 544 and 526, on the ground that 
there is no substantial evidence of contributory negligence. 
[3] There is conflicting evidence as to whether Witt 
changed lanes. Defendant testified that Witt did so when the 
cars were only about 100 fect or six car lengths apart. Witt 
testified that he first saw defendant's headlights in his rear-
view mirror about three or four seconds before the impact. The 
jury could therefore infer that Witt had changed lanes and 
moved into the path of defendant's car without determining 
whether he could do so with safety. 
[ 4] There is also substantial evidence to justify the instruc-
tion on section 544, which requires an appropriate signal be-
fore a sudden decrease in speed. Witt testified that after he had 
drawn alongside the Dodge he "started to decelerate so that 
I could pull behind the car that we were pulling over." The 
operator of the Dodge testified that after he saw the flash of 
Grossman's flashlight he drove off the roadway to the right 
and stopped. It could be inferred that Witt decelerated rap-
idly to get behind the Dodge. Defendant testified that after 
the police car moved into his lane its brake lights went on, 
that when he was approximately 50 to 75 feet behind it its 
red roof lights went on, and that he then attempted to stop. 
It was for the jury to determine in the light of this evidence 
whether the brake lights and roof lights constituted all "ap-
propriate signal" within the meaning of section 544, sub-
division (c). 
At plaintiffs' request the trial court gave an instruction 
on Vehicle Code section 454 (now §§ 21055, 21056), which 
exempts drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from observ-
ing specified provisions of the Vehicle Code (including §§ 544 
subd., (c) and 526, subd. (a» under certain conditions.l 
·Section 454 provides that the "exemptions shall apply whenever any 
said vehicle is being driven in response to an emergeney call ... or 
when used in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspeeted violator 
of the law"; that they" shall apply only when the driver of said vehicle 
sounds a siren as may be reasonably necessary and the vehiele displays 
R lighted red lamp visible from th(' front as a warning to others"; but 
that they "shall not relieve the driver of any said vehicle from the dut.y 
10 drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, 
nor shall the provisions of this section protect any sueh drivl'r from tIl(' 
C!onsC!quenees of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared in this 
Bection. " 
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Plaintiffs maintain t.hat all of the conditions set forth in 
this section were met and t]mt the trial court was therefore 
precluded as a matter of law from submitting the defense of 
eontributory neg1igence to the jury. 
[ 5a] The court instructed thc jury tl1ftt the police l'ar was 
all authorizcd emCl'llency ,"chide>. AltJlOUgh it m[l~' be assumcd 
that the other conditions of section 454 were met, the jury 
still had to determine whether Witt operated the vehicle "with 
due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway." 
[6] T]le" due regard" clause of section 454 requires tIle 
operator of an emergency ,'ehic]e to give a suitahle Wal'llillg to 
afford other users of public llighways an opportunity to yield 
the right of way. (Lucas v. C·ity of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 
476, 483 [75 P.2d 599) ; Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 
113, 117 [77 P.2d 1054] ; Reed v. Simpson, 32 Ca1.2d 444, 450 
[196 P.2d 895].) An opC'rator of an emergency vehicle does 
1I0t meet the l'equiremt'llts of the "due regard" clause if he 
docs not give the required warning until a collision is inevi-
table. [5b] In view of the conflicting evidence a.s to whether 
Witt turned on the roof 1ight soon enough to warn defendant 
to stop his vehicle or yield the right of way, the question 
whether Witt showed" due regard for the safety of all persons 
using the highway" was properly submitted to the jury. (See 
West v. Cily of San Diego, 54 Ca1.2d 469 [6 Cal.Rptr. 289, 353 
P.2d 929] ; Reed v. City of Sa11 Diego, 77 Cal.App.2d 860, 867-
868 [177 P.2d 21].) 
[7] Plaintiffs complain of an instruetioll thnt plaintiffs lUld 
1he burden of proving that t]w IH'gligenct' of d('fend~!J1t wac; tll(', 
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. The use of the definite 
instead of the indefinite article was not prejudicial in the 
light of the instruction that the aets and omission!'; of two or 
more persons may concur in causing an injury and tllat each 
such act or omission is regarded as a proximate cause. (Squier 
v. Davis Standard Bread Co., 181 Cal. 533, 537 [185 P. 391) ; 
Hellman v. Los Angdes Ry. Corp., 135 Cal.App. 627, 645 [27 
P.2d 946, 28 P.2d 384]; Dieterle v. Yellow Cab Co., 53 Cal.App. 
2d 691,694-696 [128 P.2d 132] ; MatslImoto v. Re1l1ler, 90 Cal. 
.App.2d 406,410 [202 P.2c11051].) 
[8] , The trial court refused to give the following instruc-
tion requested by plaintiffs: "When a person's lawful cmplo:r-
mCllt requirelS that he work in a dangcrous location or a place 
that involves unusual possibilities of injury, or rt'quires that in 
th(' line of his duty, he take risk" which ordinarily a reasonably 
prudent person could avoio, tIl(' necessities of such a situation, 
I"C~ 
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insofar as they limit the caution that he ean take for his own 
safety, lessen the amount of caution required of him by law 
in the exercise of ordinary care." There is no evidence that 
investigating the <1river of the Dodge required the taking of 
risks that ordinarily a reasonably prudent person could avoid. 
Moreover, the court instructed the jury that negligence is 
relative and not absolute, that allegedly negligent conduct 
must be consi<1ered in the light of all the surrounding circum-
stances, and that the amount of caution required for ordinary 
care depends upon the danger that is or should be apparent 
to the actor in the particular situation. (Cf. Fry v. Sheedy, 
143 Ca1.App.2d 615, 627 [300 P.2d 242].) 
During cross-examination of an investigating officer, de-
fendant '8 counsel read the following statement given by Witt 
and contained in the witness's accident report: "I observed 
a slow-moving vehicle northbound on Sepulveda. I followed 
this vehicle and observed it being driven straight but slow. I 
pulled up alongside this vehicle and looked at tIle driver and 
decided to interrogate him. At this time I turned on the red 
lights." The witness then testified that he remembered Witt's 
making this statement to him. On redirect examination plain-
tiff's counsel offered the remainder of Witt's statement, but de-
fendant's objection to its admission was sustained. In this part 
of the statement2 Witt stated that after turning on the roof 
lights he looked in the rear-view mirror and saw a vehicle 
coming toward him at approximately 65 miles per hour and 
that this vehicle then collided with the squad car. Plaintiffs, 
relying upon Code of Civil Procedure section 1854, contend 
that the trial court's ruling was prejudicial error. [9] That 
section provides in part that "w!len a detaehed act, declara-
tion, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other 
act, declaration, conversation, or writing, which is necessary 
to make it understood, may also be given in evidence." In 
People Y. Kent, 135 Cal.App.2d 422, 428 [287 P.2d 402], the 
court stated: "The rule that wllere part of a conversation 
has been shown in testimony the remainder of that conversation 
·We quote the words in the report immeuiately following the part 
read on cross-examination: "I looked in the rear-view mirror alld saw 
a vehicle coming up bellind me at a 11igh rate of speed, approximately 
65 m.p.h. I thought this vehiclemigllt not be able to stop as it was in 
the same ~raffic lane (N-l) as I was, and as I was only going ahout 
10 m.p.h., I was going to go forward and get over to the right, out of 
its wny. I then realized this cnr was coming too fast and it was going 
to hit my ear, so I moved to the left so our car would not hit the car 
we were intending to stop. The car c,oming behind me started to skid 
and then hit us." 
) 
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may be brought out by the opposing party, is necessarily sub-
ject to the qualification that the court may exclude those 
portions of the conversation not relevan t to the items thereof 
which have been introuuced." (See also People v. McCoy, 
25 Cal.2d 177, ]87 [153 P.2U 315] ; People v. ](iser, 24 Cal.App. 
340, 546 [141 P. 1078].) It is plaintiff's theory that the 
excluded part of Witt's statement is relevant in that it tends 
to explain when he tumed on the roof ligllts in relation to the 
moment of the impact. 
[10] 'rIw part of 'Yitt's statemeut that was read by defend-
ant's counsel is an at1mi:ssioll that "'itt did not tllJ'n 011 1li(' roof 
lights until after he had driven the police car alongside the 
Dodge. The excluded part ill no way tended to explain the 
inconsistem:ies behwen this admission and 'Witt's testimony. 
(See People v. Alv(;rf, 182 Cal.App.2d 729, 741 [6 Cal.Rptr. 
473].) Although the excluned part may innirectly suggest 
that defendant may haye llad enough time to avoid the 
accident after the roof lights were tumed on, the c:mct time 
sequence of e\'ents in the few moments preceding the accident 
was the subject of abunnant testimony. (See Long v. CaUfor-
nia-Western States Vfe b,S. Co., 43 Ca1.2d 871, 881-882 [279 
P.2d 43].) Thus, it cannot l)c said that the trial court abnsed 
its discretion in excluding t11e part of Witt'sstatment offered 
by plaintiffs. This is 1I0t a case where a party's admi,,<:ion was 
contained ill a 10llger statement and wa~ se1'iou!'1.\' f]ualifierl b~' 
other language in that statC'll:ent. In sneh a cas<:>, of course. the 
party making the admission is seriously prejudierrl if he is not 
permitted to haye the oualifying language submitted to tllp 
jury along with tIle admission. (Risdon V'. Yafc.~, 145 Cal. 210, 
212-214 [78 P. 641].) No;:- is this a case where counsel took 
part of a statemPllt out of eontext and attempte<l to twist it 
into a fatal admis~ioll. (See Rosenbe1'[] v. 'Wittenborn, 178 Cal. 
App.2d 846 [3 Cal.Hptr. 459].) 
[11] Plain! itr" contend that the trial court cOllllni, 1 <:><1 
prejudicial error ill ruling that a llOspital r<'('or<1 rontaining- a 
diagnosis of d<:>fenc1ant eould I~Ot be admitte,l ill nidpllce U11-
less the part of tIlt' reroru that refeJTcd to his condition as 
"lIBD 2-plus" \\'a5 deletC'd. ,Vithout :m arcompfl1Jyillg' ex-
planation, this cryptic, tedllJical Tt'frrrnce conld Sf'rYe ollly to 
confuse and mislea(l the jury. 
[12] Plaintiff r: rossm:l1l corr('<'11y COllt ('nds that lIe V;1lS 
prejudiced because thc instructions relating to contributory 
negligence w~re snhmitted to the jury without an explanatioll 
) 
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that the issue of contributory ll('gligen(~c dii! J:I,< i:a,",' allY l.\l'c:r-
ingupon his cause of action. At defpIHla:,t';: l"('ep:(':-;t, nl<' trial 
court gave the following instruction: "Contriliutory )1I';.rJigl'lW(, 
is negligence on the part of a person who ill( J'wj"tcr b("'OIl'I"~ a 
claimant for damages for alleged injury to Ids perSOll or his 
property and whieh negligence, concurring with the nel?ligence 
of another, contributes in some degree in proximately causing 
the damage of which the claimant thereafter complains. One 
who is guilty of contributory 'lcgligence may not recover from 
another for the injury suffered." (Italics added.) In another 
instruction the jury was told that if "the plaiutiff" was con-
tributively negligent and that. negligence was a proximate 
cause of his injuries the verdict must be for defendant. 
Defendant did not plead Grossman's contributory negli-
gence and he concedes that imputed negligence was 110t in issue. 
There is no evidence that Grossman was contributiYely il('gli-
gent. [13] When a passenger and driver brill~ an action 
against a third party it is prejudicial error to give an instruc-
tion on the passenger's contributory negligellce if that defense 
is not supported by substantial evidence and if there is sub-
stantial evidence that the driver and dcfendant were negli-
gent. (Kollert v. 01l11dijJ, 50 Ca1.2d 768, 771-772 (329 P.2d 
897] ; see also Miller v. Peters, 37 Ca1.2d 89, 95 (230 P.2d 
803] ; Ohristensen v. Bocian, 169 Cal.App.2d 223, 229 [336 
P.2d 1018]; Dike v. Goldell State 00., 125 Cal.App.2d 6, 
13-15 [269 P.2d 619].) 
[14] Defendant seeks to aYoid tIlt" forcc of th08e c'as('s b;\-
invoking the doctrine of invited error. He corre(·tJ~· points out 
that plaintiffs requested an instruction giyen by the trial COll1't 
that stated in part that" the instructions given you apply to 
each plaintiff unless otherwise stated." The fallacy in defend-
ant's argument is that plaintiffs do not contend that any 
error was committed in tIle giving of this instruction. It was 
requested along with another instruction stating that if the 
jury should :find that a plaintiff is entitled to recover it must 
assess the damage of each separately and return a verdict in 
a separate amount for each. Plaintiffs' request for these two 
instructions in no way im-ited the erroneous instruction re-
quested by defendant SUbmitting the issue of Grossman's 
contributory negligence to tIle jury. 
To the extent that the judgment agaill~t the citr is depend-
c'ut upon plaintiff Witt's appC'aJ it lUu"t 1)(' affirmed, for Witt's 
contentions are witbout merit. In ret.urning a general ver-
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allt was not negligent or that Witt was contributively negligent. 
] f defendant was not nrgligcllt, he is, of ('ourse, ))Ot liable 10 tlle 
eity; if he was negligent but the jury found that Witt was 
('ontriuutively negligent, his negligence is imputed to his 
t'll1ployer, the city, and bars its recovery for the damage to 
1 he automobile and the payments made to Witt for compensa-
tion and medical expenses. (Globe Indemnity Co. v. Hook, 
46 Cal.App. 700 [189 P. 797] ; Prosser, Torts (2d ed. 1955) 
p.299.) The city does not dispute this conclusion. 
The city contends, howeyer, tl1at the negligence of Witt, 
jf any. is not a defense to its cause of action to recover the 
mnonnt it paid Grossman in workmen's compensation. 
When an employee's injuries are compensable under tlH' 
"\Yorkmen's Compensation Act, such compensation is his ex-
dusive remedy against his employer. (Lab. Code, § 3601.) 
Labor Code section 3852, llOwever, authorizes an action by an 
employee against a third party whose negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of his injurics. 
There are threc ways in which an employer who become;; 
obligated to pay compensation to an employee may re-
l'oyrr the amouut so expended against a neg-Jig-pnt third party. 
He may bring an action direet);I' against t11r third party (Lah. 
Code, § 3852), join as a party plaintiff or intervene in an 
action brought by the employee (Lab. Code, § 3853), or allow 
the employee to prosecute the action himself and subsequently 
apply for a first lien against t11e amount of the emplo~'('e's 
,judgment, less an allowance for litigation expenses and attor-
ney's fees (Lab. Code, § 3856, subd. (b». None of these 
provisions gives any indication as to whether or not the em-
ployer's right to reimbursement is defeated when the 
employee's injuries are caused by the concurring negligence 
of the employer or another of his agents and a third party. 
[15] In Finnegan v. RoyaJ Realty Co" 35 Ca1.2d 409, 434-
435 [218 P.2d 17], affirming a judgment recovered by an em-
ployee against a third party tortfeasor, this court held that 
the defendant was not entitlcd to have the judgment reduced 
by the amount of compensation that the plaintiff had receiyed 
from his employer's insurance carrier. In so llOlding, the 
court allowed the carrier to assert its lien under Labor Code 
section 3856 even though the parties conceded that the em-
ployer "conducted his business in a grossly negligent man-
ner." (35 Ca1.2d at p. 411.) The court relied upon Pacific 
Indemnity Co. v. Caliform'a Electric Works, Ltd., 29 Cal.App. 
2d 260, 270-271 [84 P.2d 313], where it was held that a third 
70 WITT v. JACKSON [57 C.2d 
party tortfeasor could not assert the defense of the employer's 
concurrent ncgligcnce when the employer's carrier asserted 
its lien against the employee's jUdgment. (Sec also Milosevich 
v. Pa.ci/ic Elcct1'ic Ry. 00., 68 Ca1.App. 662, 668-669 [230 P. 
15].) This defense was equated with an attempt to secure con-
tribution between joint tortfeasors. Since California then fol-
lowed the common-law rule denying cont.ribution (Smith v. 
Fall flit:cr JOi11i V'l1i01I IUgh School Dist., 1 Ca1.2d 331, 339 
[34 P.2d 994] ; Ada111s v. White Bus JAnes, 184 Cal. 710 [195 
P. 389]), the court. pointed out that if there were no Work-
men's Compensation Act the defendant could not shift part of 
the respol1!libi1it~· for tIle judgment rendered against it to the 
employer's carrier. Accordingly, the court framed the question 
before it as "whether or not the 'Vorkmen's Compensation 
Act, and the payment of certain sums thereunder, operate to 
rcliet·e the [defendant] ... of a portion of its adjudicated 
responsibility." (29 Ca1.App.2d at p. 266.) (Italics added.) 
This IangmlJrc indicates that in adherence to the principle 
underlying the rule denying contribution, the court would not 
accept the defendant's defense unless it could point to an 
express provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act declar-
ing that an employer or its carrier could not assert its lien 
,,,,hen the concurrent negligence of the emplo~'er contributed 
to the employee's injuries. The enactment of Code of Civil 
Procedure sections 875-880 in 1957, hO"'ever, abrog-atl'd the rule 
of 110ncontributiol1 tllat existed when the Pacific Indemnity 
and Finnegan cases were decided. Thus, toda~', in the absence 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a negligent third party 
would be allowed contribution against a C'oncurrently neglig-ent 
employer if thc conditions of sectiol1"; 875-880 nr,' met. As a 
result of the enactment of thrs:, f;C'('tiClIs, tll(' ]'casoninl? in the 
Pacific l'l1derl11dty case, ",1Jicl! in tUI'lI was relied upon by this 
court in the Finnegan case, llas h<.'en rendered ohsolete. 
A majority of jurisdictions that }layC passed 011 tIle question 
have held that a third party tortfC'flsor cannot assert the COll-
current negligence of the C'mplo~'er as a drfense. whether thr 
employer, the e1l1plo~-C'1' 's l'arriC'l'. or the rmplo~'C'e has lJrougllt 
the action again~111im. (Cyr Y. F. S. 1)01111C Co. (D.C. COlllJ.). 
112 F.Supp. 526, 532: lfil7iollls Bros. E1I1nber CO. Y. IIleisel, 
85 Ga.App. 72 [68 S.E.211 384. 388] : Fir7r7ity d'- Casualty 00. 
v. Oe<wr VaHey Electric Co .. 187 Iowa 1014 [J74 N.W. 709, 
711] ; City of Shrcveport Y. ~r;01tfhI!'C8fcrll Ga.~ «- Electric Co., 
145 La. 680 [82 So. 78!l. 787] ; (icncral Bo:r 00. Y. lINssouri 
Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 845 [3:i S:W.211442, 44:i] ; Ft1ey Y. Tay-
/) 
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luI' (f· Gas];il1, 305 Mieh. 561 [9 N.\Y.2d 842, 847-848] ; Graham 
Y. Oily of Lincoln, J06 Neh. 30:) [183 N.W. 569] ; Royal In-
dcmnity Co. v. Sou.thern California Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 
J37 [353 P.2d 358, 363] ; Baker v. Traders & General Ins. Co. 
(10 Cir.) 199 F.2d 289 [OklallOma law] ; Clark v. Chicago, 
]1. St. P. R. Co., 214 W·b. 295 [252 N'.W. 685, 689].) Most 
of these cases have t:easoned that the employer should he able 
10 get reimhursement from the third party tortfeasor despite 
his own concurrent lleg1i~enee became tIle relevant Workmen's 
Compensation Act did not expressly preclude his recovery. 
Others have reasoned that the employer's rights against tlIC 
third party are precisely the same as the rights of the em-
ployee; since the employee i., not barred, neither is the em-
ployer. 
A few jurisdictions, howe'\'er, notably Pennsylvania and 
North Carolina, lmve not allowed the negligent employer to 
get reimbursement from thc third part~T tortfE"8Sor. (See also 
Rylander v. CltiC(fgo Shod Line Ry. Co., 17 Ill.2d 618 [161 
N.E.2d 812] ; Alaimo v. DIl POllt, 11 Ill.ApT>. 238 r136 N.E.2d 
542] ; Thornton Bros. CO. Y. Recsc, 188 Minn. 5 [246 N.W. 
527] ; Ba.ccl1e v. Ha,zcyoll Lincs (3 Cir.) 187 F.2d 403, reycl. 
011 other grounds, Jlal('yon Lillcs Y. Haeml Ship Ceiling & 
Refitting Corp., 342 U. S. 282[72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318].) 
When an employee recovers a judl!ment al!ainst a third party 
tortfeasor, Penns;\"lnll1ia allows the third party to secure 
C'ontribution from the negligent employer, limited to the 
nmount of compensation pa~'ments the employer has made 
to the employee. (Maio v. Falls, 339 Pa. 180 [14 A.2d 105, 
110] ; Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454 [155 A.2d 836, 840].) 
North Carolina, on the otller hand, holds that the third party 
is entitled to have the judgment against him reduced by the 
amount of compensation paid to tIle injured employee if he 
can prove that the concurrent l1C'gligcllce of the employer con-
tributed to tIle injuries sufi'C'reu b~' the employee. (Brown v. 
FOlltlze"ll Ry. Co., 204 N. C. 668 [169 S.E. 419); Essick v. 
City of Lexington, 233 N. C. 600 [65 S.E.2d 220,225] ; Lovette 
'\'. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663 [73 S.E.2d 886, 892].) 
[16] We find the 1"casons supporting the North Cn1"olillu 
rule persuasive. In the Browll {'asc, supra, it was stated that 
"when tIle employ(>c or lli., el>tate has been satisfied, and the 
employer seeks to re('o'\'('1" t he amount paid by him, from suell 
third party, his hands ougllt not to llaw the blood of the d('a.l 
or injured '\,orkman upon them, when he thus invo},es the 
impartial powers and proeess('s of the law." (169 S.E. at p . 
) 
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420.) The LOt'ctie case, supm, l'eit<'l'ated tl)e same argumpnt 
in more moderate lallguag<,: "It is ('ontl'aJ'Y to the policy of 
the law for the elllploYl'r, or lli~; i-iIlL;'(\~('(', tll\' immrance car-
rier, to profit by the '\T(!Jlg of the ellll'loyer." (73 S.E.2d at 
pp. 891-892.) (Sec also Star!.: v. ]'osh Construction Co., 162 
Pa. Super. 409 (162 A.2d 9, ]2).) This policy sllCl111d 1)J'('Yail 
here since there is 110thiug in the Labor Code to suggest that 
the LC'gislature cOlltc'mpJatcd that a lll'gligent employer could 
tal;:e advantage of the rcimbnrS(,Il1<'Jlt remedies that those 
sections pl'oyiul'. In t1Je aLseJj('e of ('xpre:-;'; tPl'll1S to the con-
trary, these pl'o\,jsiol1~' must be dC(,Il1Nl to be qualified by 
Civil Code seetiol) 3;:;]7 whi('h provides that "No one can take 
advantage of his own wrong." [17] Thus, whetller an aetioH 
is brought hy the elllplo~'rr or the em pI oyt't', the third party 
tortfeasor should 1)(' able to invoke the eOlll'lll'rcnt negligence of 
the emplo;ver to defeat it s rig!lt of rei III 1>ursel11(,l1t, since, in 
either ewnt, the action is brought for tIle benefit of th(' em-
plo~'er to the extellt that compeJ1<.;ation llt'uefits have been paid 
to the emplo~·ee. (Sce LOl'cffr Y. Lloy(?, supra, 73 S.E.2d at p. 
892.) 
Support f01' this ru1e is found in Balluh v. ROOel's, 24 Ca1.2d 
200 [148 P.2d 633, ]52 A.L.R. 1043), invoh';ng a plaintiff who 
was injured by -tIle nl'gligclll'c of h(')' employer while he was 
driving an automohile oWIl<,d by a third party. The court held 
that the employer-employee relationship did not bar th(' em-
ployee from brillging an a('lion Hg-ninst the third party under 
Vehicle Code section 402 [now ~% 17150-17];)7] (W11i{'h im-
putes the negligence of Ole operator of a "ehide to its owner) 
and that the exclusiv(' remedy proyj;,ions of the 'Workmen's 
Compemation Act (JJab. Code, §§ 3600-3G01 i lh1 not p1'(,(']1111(' 
the third party owner from gaillil1~ i)!<lemnity from the l'lIl-
ployer-operator under Vehiele Code sel'tion 402. 
It is true that there is no lrgal l'!'latioJl"hip ill this case 
between the employer and tlJiru party ('omparahle to the bailor-
bailee relationship UPOIl whieh the Bangh ho~r1ing was based. 
NeYl'rtheless, that ('aSl' is signifleant hel'ause the court was not 
]wrsnaded by the employer's arguIlll'ut that iig holding de-
prived him of the lil'JI grantl'd to an emplo~'l'r by Labor Code 
sl'ction 3856. "The owner will be elltitl('d to haw credited on 
the judgment against him all~' amount pai<l hy the operator 
(or his insurallC'c carri('r) b~' way of l'ompl'llsation for the 
injuQ', and the amount to be l'eeoverrd by the bailor-owner 
from the bailee-operator necessarily will be reduced pro tanto." 
(24 Ca1.2d at p. 216.) It is evident from this language that 
) 
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had tlle employcr brought an action in l1is own name against 
the third party under Labor Code section 3852 he would not 
have becn allowed to recover compensation payments made to 
the employee. [18] Thus, when a person is {'ntitled to indem-
nity against a negligent employer, the employer cannot tpC'ovcr 
reimbursement for compensation payments made to an injured 
employee eitller by asserting a lien against a judgment recov-
ered by the employee or by bringing an action directly a,:rainst 
the third party. (See San Francisco Unified Scltool Dist. v. 
Oalifornia, BlIildin!J ~Iainte11(/l1Ce 00 .• 162 Cal.App.2d 434 [328 
P.2d 785] ; ct. Lab. Code, § 3864.) A negligent employer should 
be ill no better position when, as here, the third party tort-
feasor does not seck indpmnity; to allow tIle emplo~'er Trim-
bursement in either case would allow him to profit from his 
own wrong. Since, however, th(' injured employee may not be 
allowed double recover~', llis damages 11111st be reduced by the 
amount of workmen's compensation 11e received. 
The judgment is affirmed as to plaintiff Witt and the city. 
The judgment is reversed as to plaintiff Grossman. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER., J., Concurring and Disseuting.-I find in the 
record no error shown to be prejudicial to either of the 
plaintiffs or to the intervener. Accordingly I would affirm the 
judgment in its entirety. 
In the abscllce of a showing by plailltiff-appel1ant Grossman 
that the 'verdict against him was based on a finding that he 
was contrihutively negligent we should assume-indeed, on· 
this record, infer-in favor of the judgment, that the "erdiet 
implies a finding that defendant was not negligent. 
The handling of appeals in personal injur~· actions now con-
stitutes an oyerly large portion of the work of this court. We 
should not lightly presume in favor of reyersal that an error 
ill instructions has worked a miscarriage of justice within the 
provisions of the Constitution, article VI, section 4%.1 
There is no suggestion in the majority opinion that the 
"'No judgment shall be set. aside, or Dew trilll grnntc<l, in any cnst', 
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission 
or rejection.Df eyidcnec, or for nny error as to :my matter of pleading, 
or for any error as to :my mnttl'r of procedure, l1nlc~R, nfter an exnmi-
nation of the entire cause, including the eyidenee, the court shall 
be of the opinion that til(> error fOIll)llnined of has reRultcd in II, IDis-
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trial Accident CommiRsion is required to make an independent 
examination of thc record when it rejects the findings and 
recommendations of its referee. (Lab. Code, § 5315.) 
Id.-Bearing-Examiners.-The requirement of a hearing by 
the Industrial Accident COlllmission prior to making an award 
may be satisfied though members of the commission do not 
actually hear or even read all of the evidence. Evidence may 
be taken by an examiner, and the evidence thus taken may 
be sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates. 
Id.-Bearing-Reference.-The obligation of panel members 
of the Industrial Accident Commission is to achieve a substan-
tial understanding of the record in n compensation case by any 
reasonable menns, including the usc of a referee's summary. 
Id.-Bearing-Reference.-There is no reason for distinguish-
ing between the oral and writtcn evidence developed before a 
referee in a workmen's compensation cnse; both should be 
considered by the Industrial Accident Commission if relev:mt 
to the issues. On the other hand, there is no reason for requir-
ing that irrelevant parts of either the written or oral evidence 
he reviewed exhaustively; the transcript is as much a part of 
the record as is evidence receh'ed in written form. 
Id.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Evidence.--On re-
eOllsiaemtion of a disability rating awnrd by the Industrial 
Accident Commission, the disnbled employee's testimony was 
relevant to the issues where her testimonv related almost 
exclusively to the ~xtent of her disnhiIit~·, which was the sole 
issue presented to a panel of the commission on reconsideration. 
Id. - Reconsiderati.on of Order or Award - Evidence. - The 
panel mem hers of the Industrinl Accident Commission were 
not oblignted to rend the entire record, including the trnn-
s('.ript, on reconsideration of 1I disability rating award by the 
commission; the written evidence together with n referee's 
summary of the disnbled employee's testimony was ample to 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Workmen's COlllpemntion, § 30S. 
[5] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compenf;ntion, § 319 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4J Workmen's Compensation, § 151; 
[5-12,14] Workmen's Compensntion, ~ 2]8; [13] Workmen's Com-
pensation, § 165. 
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provide n complete nnu full UIlUl!l"..t:lI1uiug" of the record. The 
compensntion carrier's contention thllt the referee's summary 
was inadequate was without merit "'here it was not suggested 
in what particulars it was defective, and where it actually 
emphasized the parts of the employee's testimony most favor-
able to the carrier. 
[7] Id.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Hearing.-Informal 
use of the rating bureau's opinions by a panel of the Industrial 
Accident Commission, on reconsideration of a disability rating 
award by the commission, was error but was not prejudicial 
to the compensation carrier where the award after reconsidera-
tion was clearly based on a second rating recommended by the 
bureau upon a newly formulated disability statement and 
formally noticed and served, the carrier was allowed to cross-
examine the rating expert and introduce rebuttal evidence 
with respect to his report, and there was nothing that the 
carrier could have accomplished in a hearing on the informal 
report that it was not permitted to accomplish in the hearing 
held on the formal report. 
[8] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Evidence.-The ref-
eree, on reconsideration of a disability rating award by the 
Industrial Accident Commission, properly disallowed the in-
troduction of further medical evidence bearing on the extent 
of the employee's disability and other evidence relating to 
her occupational classification at the hearing for cross-examina-
tion of the rating expert, where that hearing was in terms 
limited to examination and evidence bearing on accuracy of 
the rating expert's conclusion, his recommendation was based 
on the disability statement prepared by a panel of the com-
mission, and the expert had no way of knowing whether or 
not the factors of disability included in that statement were 
accurate. 
[9] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Hearing.-The In-
dustrial Accident Commission, on reconsideration of a dis-
ability rating award, was not bound to grant the compensation 
carrier's motion for further hearing for presentation of further 
medical evidence bearing on the extent of the employee's dis-
ability and other evidence relating to her occupational classi-
fication where the right to a further hearing for introduction 
of rebuttal evidence is statutory (Lab. Code, § 5704), the only 
matters added to the record after the initial hearing were the 
secret and formal reports of the rating bureau, and the com-
pensation carrier was given an adequate hearing with respect 
to these reports. 
[10] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Hearing.-BeYOlld 
the statutory right to a further hearing, on reconsideration 
of a disability rating awnrd by the Industrial A('cident COIll-
mission, the granting of continuances and further hearing'S 
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rests in the sound discretion of the commission. (Cal. Admin. 
Code, tit. 8, rule 10774.) 
[11] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Rearing.-On re-
consideration of a disability rating award by the Industrial 
Accident Commission, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny 
the compensation carrier's request that it be permitted to show 
that the employee worked in the canning rather than in the 
produce industry, thereby allegedly reducing her disability 
from 77 per cent (which was recommended by the rating 
bureau) to 64 per cent and relieve the carrier of its present 
liability for a life pension, where at the initial hearing it 
was agreed that the occupational category should be "Celery 
trimmer-produce, by hand." 
[12] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Rearing.-On re-
consideration of a disability rating award by the Industrial 
Accident Commission, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny 
the compensation carrier's request for a hearing to introduce 
the report of an independent medical examiner where there 
was no claim that therc was not a complete and full oppor-
tunity to introduce all relevant medical evidence at the orig-
inal hearing. 
[13] ld.-Evidence.-The Industrial Accident Commission has the 
power to resoh'e conflicts in the evidence. 
[14] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Evidence.-A state-
ment of an employce's disability formulated by a panel of the 
Industrial Accident Commission that provided the basis for 
the commission's disability rating award after reconsideration 
was supported entirely by one physician'S report that was sub-
mitted at the Ol"iginal hearing, though this report was incon-
sistent both with thc oth<'1' medical opinions in the record and 
with the referec's observations of the employee described in 
his report. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission awarding compensation for personal in-
juries, after reconsideration of a disability rating award. 
A ward affirmed. 
Mnllen & Filippi and John W. Moore for Petitioner. 
Everett A. Corten, Emily B. Johnson, Rupert A. Pedrin, 
Magee, Ott & HaY"'ood and Sidney H. Haywood for R€-
!'pondents. 
TRA YNOR, J.-l\Targe E. Lawler Lintz sustained a back 
injury ill the course' of her employment as a celery trimmer. 
Allied Compe'nsatioll 1n!'u1'al1(,(, Company, hereinafter re-
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ferred to as Allied, the compensation carrier, voluntarily fur-
nished medical care and tcmporary compensation. After sub-
!;tantial treatment an operation v;as performed. Although Mrs. 
Lintz's condition showed improvement, some disability rc-
mained. 
Upon her application for compensation she was examined 
orally before a commission referee. Medical reports were also 
introduced. From this evidence the referee formulated a 
statement of disability. The commission's Permanent Dis-
ability Rating Bureau rated the disability as stated at 32¥2 
per cent. The referee summarized tile oral evidence and then 
adopted the 32~ per cent figure in his findings and award of 
April 22, 1960. 
Mrs. Lintz's petition for reconsideration ,vas granted to 
secure the opinion of an independent medical examiner as to 
the extent of her disability "if the parties so agree." Mrs. 
Lintz agreed to the examination on condition that it involve 
no cost to her. Allied offered to pay only half the cost, al-
though it also offered to abide by the practice of the commis-
sion in similar cases. Panel One of the commission apparently 
concluded that the parties had failed to agree as to who should 
bear the costs of the examination and proceeded to redeter-
mine Mrs. Lintz's disability on the basis of the medical 
reports introduced at tbe first hearing, tbe referee's report, 
and his summary of Mrs. Lintz's testimony. Inasmuch as no 
transcript of her testimollY ,vas requested by the parties or 
ordered by the commission, no member of the deciding pan('l 
was familiar with it except as it was summarized by the ref-
eree and referred to in the briefs of the parties. 
Panel One informally secured from the rati1lg bureau in-
formation as to what ratings would be recommended if various 
factors of disability were in('Iuded in the disability statement. 
The parties were not notified of tbis inquiry or of the bureau's 
answer. The panel then formulated a ne,v disability state-
ment and submitted it to the bureau formally. The recom-
mended rating was 77 per cent. Allied was granted a hearing 
for cross-examination of the rating expert and presentation 
of evidence in rebuttal to his report. The exp('rt t('stified tbat 
the difference between the first and second ratillgs was caused 
solely by the inclusion in the seeond statement of Mrs. Lintz's 
limitation "to sedentary occupations .... " Oue of the medical 
reports stateq that she "could probably do some SeOf'lltary 
work, but anything requiring prolonged standing, lifting or 
bending would not be feasible for an indefinite time." The 
) 
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other medical reports inclieatecl tllat her injury was less severe 
and that she was not so narrowly limitecl occupationally. The 
referee concluded that" applicant's demeanor on the stand" 
was consistent with these latter reports. Allied's efforts at 
this llearing to introduce additional evidence relating to her 
disability and occupational classification were unsuccessful. 
A motion for a further hearing at which this evidence might 
be introduced was denied. The commission adopted the 77 
per cent figure in its award after reconsideration. 
Allied seeks annulment of the commission's award. Its prin-
cipal contention is that it was deni<>d a fair hearing beC'ause 
the second disability statement was formulated without refer-
ence to the entire record. [1] It is clear that. the commis-
sion is required to make an independent examination of the 
recorcl when, as here, it rejects the findings and recommenda-
tions of its referee. (Lab. Code, § 5315 j .lfaiional Auto «; Oas. 
Ins. 00. V. Industrial Acc. Oorn., 34 Ca1.2d 20, 30 r206 P.2d 
841] ; Pacific I?ldem. 00. V. Industriol Acc. Oom., 28 Cal.2d 
329, 339 [170 P.2d 18] ; Oal1'fonlia Shipbuildin[J Oorp. Y. In-
dust"ial Acc. Com., 27 Ca1.2d 536, 544 [165 P.2cl 669] ; Hel-
mick V. Indusfl"ial Acc. Oom., 46 Cal.App.2cl 651, 656 [116 
P.2d 658] ; Taylor v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 38 Cal.App.2d 75, 
82 [100 P.2d 511] j sce also GOY. Code, § 1]517, suhd. (a); 
000PC1' V. State BOQl'd of Medical Examiners, 35 Ca1.2d 242, 
246 [217 P.2d 630, 18 A.L.n.2d 593] ; Boh"citrr Y. Gal'1'ison, 
81 Ca1.App.2d 384, 399 [J 84 P .2d 323].) The extent of that 
independent examination has not, howe'ver, been clearly cle-
tlnecl. In the first Morgan case the United States Suprcme 
Court held generally that "The one who decides must hear." 
(Morgan V. U,tlited Statc.~, 298 U. S. 468, 481 [56 S.Ct. 906, 
80 L.Ed. 1288].) [2 J The re(luirement of a hf>aring may 
be satisfied, ho,vever, even though the members of the commis-
sion do not actually lwar (Ooope!' v. State Board of M ed-iral 
Examiners, supra, p. 246; Morgan V. Un-ifed States, supra, pp. 
480-482; McGraw Electric 00. V. United States (E.D. Mo.), 
120 F.Supp. 354, 358, affd. 348 U. S. 804 [75 S.Ct. 45, 99' 
L.Ed. 635]), or even read, all of the evidence. (Lmllbermen's 
M1tt. Ca.s. 00. V. Industrial Acc. 00111., 29 Ca1.2d 492, 50] [175 
P.2d 823] ; M01'gcr1! V. United States, supra, pp. 480-482; 7'aub 
v. Pirnie, 3 ,N.Y. 188 [144 N.E.2cl 3, 5] ; Wiscon.sin V. Ind1ls-
trial Oom., 272 Wis. 409 [76 N.W.2d 362, 369-370] ; Sf>e Rl~o 
United States Y. Morgan, 313 F. S. 409, 420 r61 S.Ct. 999, 85 
L.Ed. 1429].) "EvidC'llce may be taken by an examiner. Evi-
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dence thus taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent 
subordinates." (Morgan v. United States, supra, 298 U. S. 
468,482; Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
supra, p. 501.) [3] The obligation of the panel members 
was to achieve a substantial understanding of the record by 
any reasonable means, including the use of the referee's sum-
mary. (See 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 1].02-
11.04, pp. 38-57.) 
[ 4:] Panel One admittedly considered the entire record, 
excepting only the complete transcript of Mrs. Lintz's testi-
mony. The commission now contends that the transcript is 
not a part of the record within the meaning of the California 
statutes and cases. This view has been suggested by at least 
one commentator. (Bancroft, Some Procedural Aspects of the 
California Workmen's Compensation La'U', 40 Cal. L. Rev. 
378, 392.) There is no apparent reason, however, for distin-
guishing between the oral and written evidence developed be-
fore the referee; both should be considered if relevant to the 
issues. On the other hand, there is no reason for requiring 
that irrelevant parts of either the written or oral evidence be 
reviewed exhaustively. The transcript is as much a part of the 
record as is evidence received in written form. 
[ 5 ] There is no merit in the commission's contention that 
it was not necessary to consider Mrs. Lintz's testimony on the 
ground that it was not relevant to the issues on reconsider-
ation. Her testimony related almost exclusively to the extent 
of her disabilit~,. The referee's summary of her testimony. 
which was before Panel One on reconsideration, made this 
clear. The extent of disability was the sole issue presented to 
the panel. Thus, Mrs. Lintz's testimony ,vas highly relevant. 
[6] Allied takes an equally unrealistic position. It con-
tends that the panel members were obligated to read the entire 
record, including the transrript. So rigid a requirement can-
not be extracted from the decided cases. It is plain that tll" 
members of Panel One" considered and appraised" tIle evi-
dence in the record. The written evidence together with th" 
referee's summary of Mrs. Lintz's testimony was ample to 
provide a complete and full understanding of the re('or(1. Al-
lied contends that the referee's summary is not adequate. It 
is not suggested, however, in what particulars it is defer·tive. 
Indeed, the summary emphasizes the parts of Mrs. Lintz's 
testimony most favorable to Allied. Allied at no time urg'rd 
upon the commission the inadequacy of the summary. Had it 
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clone so, pointing to speeifie, material defects in the summary, 
the commission would 118ve lJeen ohliged to order a transcript 
prepared to 1 est the aceurac'y and ('ompletelless of the summary 
against it. Despite Allied's failure to point to specific inade-
fluacies in the summary, we haw compared it with the tra11-
fwript and have fOllnd 110 material evidenee tending' to support 
Allied's ease tllat was ]Jot fairly sllmmarized by the referee. 
[7] Allied ('onteud8 that it was denied a fair hearing by 
PalJel One's informal use of the rating bureau's opinions. 
Such practices have been disapproved. (Young Y. Indnstrial 
Acc. Corn., 38 Cal.App.2d 250, 257 [100 P.2d ]062].) The 
award after reeonsideration, however, was dearly based upon 
the second recommended rating, which "'as formally noticed 
and served. A1lied was allowrd to eross-examine the rating 
expert and introduce rebuttal evidence with respect to llis 
report. There appears to he nothing tlmt Allied could have 
accomplished in a hearing on 1111' informal report tlwt it was 
])ot permitted to accomplish in the hearing held on the formal 
report. Thus, the error was not prejudicial. (See Walsh v. 
JlId1lsiria.l Ace. Com., 1 Ca1.2cl 747, 748-749 [36 P.2d ]072].) 
[8] Allied also contends that it was denied a fair hearing 
hy the refusal of the commiso;ion's referee to allow introduc-
tion of further medic!!l evidellce b~nring 011 the extent of :Mrs. 
Lintz's disability and other e"ideurc relating to her occupa-
tional classification at. the hearing for cross-examination of the 
rating expert. That hearing was in terms limited to exami-
nation and e"idence bearing 011 the ac('uraey of the rating 
expert's eOlldusioll. His recommendation was based upon t]1C 
disability statelll<>nt prepar<>d by Pmwl One .. The expert had 
no way of knowing w]lethcr or not the factors of disahility 
included in that statement w(>r(> accurate. The referee prop<>r]y 
disa])owed the proff<.'red <,,,jdNIee. 
[9] Alternatively; Alli",d contends that the commission 
was bound to grant its motion for further hearing for presenta-
tion of this ",,,idem'e. The right to a further h<>aring for intro-
duction of rebuttal e .... idence is statutory: 
"Transcripts of a)] testjJ11011~' ta1\",n without notiee and 
copies of all reports and other matters aodell to the rf'cord, 
otherwise than dUl'in~ tlIl' l'onrse of an open hearing, shall be 
served upoll the part irs 10 the r.J'o(·('('diug, and an opportnnity 
shall be gjyen to prorlul'(' rvi,ll'llCe in explallntion or rebuttal 
thereof before decision is rendered." (Lah. Code, § 5704.) 
Thc only matters addrd to tIl(' reeord after the initial llear-
\ 
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ing were the secret and thc formal rcports of the rating 
bureau. Allied was given an adcq\1ate hearing with respect 
to these reports. 
[10] Beyond this statut ory rig-lit to a further hearing, 
the granting of continuances Hlld further hearing's rests in the 
sound discretion of the commission. (11' estct·n Pipe «('; Steel 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 194 Cal. 379, 382 [228 P. 859] ; 
see also Geibel v. State Bar, 11 Cal.2d 412, 41G, 417 [79 P.2d 
1073] ; Tapley Y. State Bat", 8 Ca1.2d 167, 170-171 [64 P.2d 
404].) The commission's rules of practice and procedure pro-
vide that a further hearing will not be granted excrpt for good 
cause or in the discretion of the commission or its officers. 
(Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, rule 10774.) [11] Allied argues 
that it sbould be permitted to show tbat Mrs. Lintz worked in 
the canning rather than ill the produce industry. The former 
classification allegcdly would reduce her disability to 64 per 
cent and relieve Allied of its present liability for a life 
pension. At the initial bearing, however, it was agreed that the 
occupational category should be "Celery trimmer-produce, 
by hand." [12] Allied also demands a hearing to intro-
duce the report of an indepcndent medical examiner. There is 
no claim, however, that there was not a complete and full 
opportunity to introduce all relevant medical evidence at the 
original hearing. In light of these circumstances, we cannot 
hold that the commission abused its discretion in denying 
Allied's request for a further hearing. 
Allied's contention that there is no substantial evidence in 
the record to support the award is without merit. [13] The 
<:ommission has the power to resolve conflicts ill the evidence. 
(Natiollal Auto. cf: Cas. Ins. Co. Y. Indllst,·ial Ace. Com., supra, 
pp. 28-29.) [14] The statement of Mrs. Lintz's disability 
formulated by Panel One that provided the basis for the com-
mission's award after reconsideration is supported entirely by 
one pll~'sieian 's report that was submitted at the original hear-
ing. Even though this report is in(-onsistent both with the 
other medieal opinions in the record and with the referee's 
observations of Mrs. Lintz described in his report, it consti-
tutes substantial evidence and may be adopted by the com-
mission. Allied's suggestion that tht' commission misinter-
preted the meaning of this report is without merit. 
Both the referee and Panel One found that Mrs. Lintz's 
entire disability ,,~as caused by the industrial injury, rejecting 
Allied's contention that it was caused in part by an earlier 
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injury. Allied is also incorrect in asserting that this finding 
is not supported by substantial evidence. 
The award is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would annul the order, for the 
reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Shoemaker in the opinion 
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal, (Cal.App.) 
14 Cal.Rptr. 695. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
